Abstract: Public pensions for Illinois state workers are among the worst funded in the nation. Benefit generosity is not the primary culprit: Illinois is around the middle of the distribution of state plans based on initial retirement benefits. Although the annually compounded three percent post-retirement benefit increase makes Illinois' pensions one of the more expensive systems on a lifetime basis, this only partially offsets the fact that most Illinois workers do not participate in Social Security. We present evidence that the main reason for Illinois' underfunding is a history of making inadequate contributions, dating back to the very origins of the state's public pensions. We discuss the recent history and current uncertain legal status of pension reform efforts in the state. Using a fiscal model of the state's finances, we project how Illinois' fiscal situation may evolve in the future, both with and without pension reform being upheld by the courts. A key finding is that with or without pension reform, Illinois will continue to face significant structural deficits that will require revenue increases or additional spending cuts to address.
INTRODUCTION
The State of Illinois is recognized for many positive attributes, as diverse as being the "Land of Lincoln" and the first state to ratify the 13 th Amendment abolishing slavery (McClelland 2012) to being home of Chicago's "Magnificent Mile." However, the state is also known for its poor fiscal management, currently having the worst bond rating of any state 1 as well as several of the most poorly funded public pensions in the nation (Sielman 2013) . Indeed, the poor funding status of the major state pension plans is often blamed for being the root of the state's fiscal problems. Many commentators have suggested that it is the "lavish" level of pension benefits that have created the current fiscal situation (Ridell 2014) .
This paper presents a case study of Illinois pensions with an objective of understanding pension funding in a broader fiscal context. In particular, we seek to shed light on the extent to which the current fiscal stress is the result of relatively generous public pensions versus the state's history of making insufficient contributions. Naturally, these two issues are closely connected, as benefit levels drive required contributions, thus making it impossible to precisely disentangle the two factors. Nonetheless, we provide suggestive evidence by comparing Illinois benefits for public employees to those in other states and by examining the history of pension funding in the state. In general, our findings mirror those of Munnell (2012) who characterizes
Illinois as a state "with moderately expensive plans that [has] assiduously avoided funding."
More specifically, we find that public pensions in Illinois are not significant outliers in terms of expense or generosity. A comparison of initial retirement benefits of a public worker in 1 According to the Illinois Office of the Comptroller (IOC 2015a), the state's general obligation bond rating was Awith a negative outlook from Fitch, A3 with a negative outlook from Moody's, and A-with a negative outlook from Standard & Poor's.
Illinois to similar workers in other states places Illinois somewhere in the middle of the pack. On a lifetime basis, however, Illinois benefits are more generous, and thus more expensive, due to the fixed nominal "automatic annual increase" (AAI) of three percent (commonly, though inaccurately, referred to as a COLA). However, the relative generosity of the AAI must be weighed against the reality that the most Illinois public workers are not part of the U.S. Social
Security system, and thus Illinois pensions need to be more generous than those in the majority of states where workers have a public pension on top of Social Security in order for total retirement contributions and benefits to be similar.
If the generosity of pensions is not the root cause of the state's funding situation, then
what is? We discuss that the state has an incredibly long history of making insufficient contributions, effectively engaging in borrowing by underfunding the pensions. This has created an enormous unfunded pension obligation, the servicing of which now places significant strain on Illinois' public finances.
To understand the strain that public pension funding places on the state budget prospectively, we project state spending and revenues 30 years into the future, using a projection model from the University of Illinois' "Fiscal Futures Project." We find that even if recent pension reforms are held constitutional, the state's long-term fiscal outlook features large gaps between projected revenues and projected expenditures. In short, many decades of borrowing against future generations has placed Illinois in a difficult fiscal situation that will be hard to resolve without significant increases in taxes or cuts in a wide range of spending programs.
This paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we present an overview of the public pensions in Illinois and discuss the relative importance of benefit generosity and contribution levels in leading to current low funding ratios. In section 3 we provide a history of the policy responses, or lack thereof, to pension funding shortfalls, with a special emphasis on reforms that have occurred in the past few years. In section 4, we discuss the shortcomings of the Illinois budget process. We also discuss the University of Illinois' "Fiscal Futures Project," a set of tools that help to overcome some of the problems associated with publicly available state budget documents. In section 5, we apply the tools from the Fiscal Futures Project to project Illinois' budget gap over the next 30 years. We conclude in section 6.
PUBLIC PENSIONS FOR STATE WORKERS IN ILLINOIS

Overview of Statewide Pensions
There are six major statewide public pension plans in Illinois: The State Employees'
Retirement System (SERS), the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS), the State Universities Retirement system (SURS), the Judges' Retirement System (JRS), the General Assembly Retirement system (GARS) and the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF). The first five of these plans all represent financial obligations of the State of Illinois and must be funded out of the state's revenue. Table 1 represents the official funding status as of June 30, 2014. These funding ratios, which are calculated using the actuarial value of liabilities and the market value of assets, show that the overall funding level of the combined Illinois pensions is only 43 percent. Of course, the actual funding situation is much worse than this because the actuarial value of the liability is computed using expected asset returns rather than a risk-free rate, a point made forcefully in numerous papers (e.g., Novy-Marx and Rauh 2011; Brown and Wilcox 2008; Brown and Pennacchi, this volume) . 
Sources of the Funding Shortfall
How Generous Are Illinois Public Pensions?
There is no single metric for comparing the generosity of benefits across all public pension plans. In comparing any two states, one state might offer a higher benefit to teachers but a lower benefit to general state workers. Or one state might be more generous for a full-5 career worker, but be less generous to part-career workers. Numerous other parameters, such as retirement age or the definition of compensation, also vary from plan to plan and thus can lead to states being ranked differently for different employee characteristics. Nonetheless, it is instructive to examine a few examples in to assess whether Illinois benefits are an outlier.
In Figure 1 , we report benefit comparisons from Biggs (2014) Within Illinois, the workers under SERS differ from teachers and university employees in an important way: many SERS workers are covered by Social Security, whereas most other public employees are not. Thus, it is also instructive to compare benefits across states for a set of workers that are not covered by Social Security in Illinois. We focus on teachers, using a public pension benefit calculator created by the Manhattan Institute (Public Sector Inc. 2015).
To Figure 1 above. Again, this measure suggests that the Illinois TRS system is not an outlier in terms of generosity, especially considering the differences in Social Security coverage.
The story changes when one accounts for the 3 percent automatic annual adjustment (AAI). Using the Manhattan Institute calculator, when ranked on the value of the equivalent price of a lifetime annuity that would replicate the pension benefit, Illinois climbs to 7 th out of 46 in generosity. It is no wonder, then, that most recent pension reform proposals have targeted this AAI for reduction (see below for more discussion).
Overall, a key take-away from this analysis is that the initial level of benefits offered from Illinois public plans are not an outlier relative to other public plans. However, Illinois' post-2 The calculator did not provide values for Nebraska, Ohio or Pennsylvania. We also dropped Wisconsin because the benefit levels were such an outlier on the low side that we were concerned that our parameter combination was not reflective of a Wisconsin worker.
retirement benefit increase of 3 percent compounded annually is significantly more generous (and thus more expensive to the state) than those in most other states, at least given recent rates of inflation. When one considers the combined generosity and expense of public pensions and Social Security, there is simply no evidence that Illinois is more generous than other states with better funding ratios.
A History of Insufficient Contributions
Although Illinois' public pension problems have received much attention in the media in recent years, the problem is long-standing. Eric Madiar, until recently the chief legal counsel for This "inadequacy of government contributions" has continued for more than a half century after this report was issued. As shown in Figure 2 , recreated from Madiar (2014), funding levels of the five statewide public pension plans has never exceeded 75 percent during the 1968-2013 period. In short, low funding levels are the norm, not the exception.
Figure 2
Source: Madiar (2014) Nor have things improved since 2013. In his February 2015 budget address, the newlyelected Illinois Governor, Bruce Rauner (2015a) , stated "our pension systems are not fully funded. They are $111 billion in the hole -the worst pension crisis in America." As already noted, even this $111 billion shortfall is too rosy, given that it uses an artificially high discount rate to calculate the present value of the promised benefits.
The Illinois Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability (CoGFA 2015) reports that the unfunded liability of the state's pensions grew by over $87 billion from 1984 to 2012. They also note that the single largest cause -comprising just under 50 percent of the total growth in underfunding -was that the state's contributions fell below the actuarially required level. No other single factor -investment returns, changes in actuarial assumptions, benefit increases, etc. -comprised more than 20 percent of the deterioration of funding status.
POLICY RESPONSES TO PENSION FUNDING CONCERNS IN ILLINOIS
Pre-2010: Decades of Inaction
Despite the long-standing funding concerns, and numerous calls over the years to do something about them, there have been very few serious attempts to improve the funding of the system. Ironically, the single most consequential response to these funding shortfalls was not to find a mechanism for improving funding, but rather to make the commitment to pay the promised benefits even more binding on the state. In short, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the constitution requires benefits be paid, but not that they be funded. Thus, the constitution increases the security of pension benefits, but at the cost of substantially reducing the state's flexibility to address fiscal shortfalls through changes to public pension benefits.
Just a few years after the adoption of the 1970 constitution, the Illinois General Assembly adopted a funding rule linking state pension contributions to pension payouts.
Madiar (2014) In 1994, the Illinois legislature passed and then-Governor Edgar signed Public Act 88-593, which created a new funding path for public pensions. There are at least three notable features of this plan. First, the funding goal was set at only 90 percent of liabilities (calculated using standard actuarial calculations, including inappropriately high discount rates). Second, the path to this funding level was stretched over 50 years, reaching this 90 percent funding level in 2045. Third, the funding plan was back-loaded, with a 15-year "funding ramp" that kept contributions well below standard actuarial levels in the early years. By 2010, the state's required contributions under this law were to be set at a level where they would remain a constant fraction of payroll, set at a level sufficient to reach 90 percent funding by 2045.
Since 1995, the state has not consistently met even these inadequate funding requirements. Even when the state did make substantial contributions, it was often done in a manner that partly reduced the impact of the funding. It is important to note that this approach to using POBs does virtually nothing to boost the pension plan's funding status over the long-term. Conceptually, a state could convert implicit pension debt -in the form of benefit obligations -to explicit debt, thereby providing a mechanism for reducing unfunded liabilities. But rather than using POBs to reduce unfunded pension obligations in this way, Illinois has instead used them as a source of funds for making statutorily scheduled annual pension contributions. This, in turn, allows the legislature to avoid higher taxes or spending cuts in other programs in the short-run. Effectively, the POBs end up having little to do with pensions, and instead serve as a form of general borrowing by the state.
All in all, the State of Illinois' record at dealing with pension funding over the past century can best be described as one of consistently contributing at a rate below that required to bring the systems to full funding. With the pension funding "ramp-up" of contributions as a share of payroll from the 1995 law being fully phased-in by FY 2010, the statutorily required annual pension contributions accounted for $4.0 billion, or 17.7 percent of total state-source General Fund revenues (CoGFA 2011). These facts, among other factors, finally put Illinois pension reform on the political and legislative agenda.
The Creation of a Two Tier System in 2010
In 2010, the Illinois legislature passed Public Act 96-0889, which created a "two tier" pension system. Tier I included all public employees that had been hired on or before
December 31, 2010. Tier II created a new and substantially less generous system for state workers hired on or after January 1, 2011. 3 The key difference between the tiers is summarized in Table 2 , and includes changes to vesting, normal retirement age, the definition of final rate of earnings, a reduction in the post-retirement benefit increases, and a cap on pensionable earnings.
4 (2015) 3 The lack of generosity is dramatically illustrated by a quote from the TRS CAFR FY14 (2015, p. 29), "Tier I's liability is partially funded by Tier II members, as the Tier II member contribution is higher than the cost of Tier II benefits." 4 The 2010 two-tier reform law interacts with the 1994 contribution-ramp law in a way that results in further backloading of payments to reduce unfunded liability. While GASB standards allow amortization of unfunded liabilities over multiple years at a fixed percent of payroll, the Illinois ramp-law calculates the state's combined annual contribution for amortization and normal costs as a share of payroll. The lack of generosity of Tier II benefits and the gradual replacement of Tier I by Tier II workers results in a significant decline in normal cost as share of payroll over time -from 19.0 percent in 2015 to a projected 9.9 percent in 2045 (CoGFA 2015, p. 34) . Consequently, the share of the state's contribution going to amortization of unfunded liability will increase in later years.
Because this new Tier II benefit structure applied only to individuals who were not yet employees of the state as of the time the law took effect, this reform did not diminish or impair benefits of any existing employees, and thus did not cause constitutional concerns. The other side of the coin, however, is that this reform had very little effect on the existing unfunded obligations of the system, or any meaningful effect on the near-term cash outflows from the system. Thus, political pressure to enact more far-reaching reform continued to build.
The 2013 Illinois Pension Reform
Efforts to reform Illinois pensions reached a fever pitch in 2013. During the spring legislative session, two major reform bills were being pushed, one by the powerful House
Speaker Madigan, and the other by Senate President Cullerton. Both sought to reduce the Automatic Annual Increase (AAI), which provides a 3 percent annually compounded benefit increase to retirees. Although commonly referred to as a COLA, it is important to note that the AAI is set at 3 percent annually regardless of the rate of inflation. As noted earlier, this makes the AAI a rather expensive provision -both in absolute dollar terms and relative to other states -at least given current inflation expectations. The two bills differed substantially in their approach. The Madigan-sponsored bill imposed a reduction in the AAI, capping it the lesser of 3 percent or ½ of the CPI. The Cullerton bill, which garnered some support from labor unions, offered a lower AAI in return for state funding guarantees and access to retiree health care, among other provisions. Importantly, the access to retiree health care would be implemented by removing already existing retiree health care from employees that chose not to accept the AAI reduction, rather than adding it as a benefit to those that did.
Neither bill was able to pass both houses of the Illinois General Assembly, and thus negotiations continued in the summer (including a report of a ten-member, bipartisan, bicameral committee) and into the fall. Finally, the legislature passed Senate Bill 1 (SB1) on December 3, 2013 and was signed by the Governor as Public Act 98-599 two days later. The law applied to four of the five public plans outlined above: the judges' plan was omitted, presumably to avoid conflicts of interest in the inevitable court challenges that were to follow.
The reform included numerous provisions which were intended to take effect on July 1, 2014, although the implementation is on hold pending legal challenges.
Under this new law, the AAI is reduced from 3 percent of the total pension amount, A fifth provision is to reduce employee contributions from 8 percent of pay to 7 percent of pay. All else equal, a reduction in contributions obviously harms the funding status of the system. This was, however, an attempt by the legislature to convince the courts that participants were being given something of value in return for the changes to benefits, and thus should be held constitutional (more on this below).
A sixth provision of the law is to create an optional defined contribution (DC) plan that individuals can voluntarily choose to enter in exchange for stopping future benefit accruals under the DB system. As designed, however, the optional DC plan does not appear to be financially attractive (Brown 2014) . Brown (2014) illustrates the net effect of these provisions on benefits of hypothetical employees and finds the reductions to be quite substantial, especially for higher income employees. Under his stylized calculations, a worker earning $40,000 per year would see no immediate impact on her initial pension, although the reduction in the automatic annual increase would lead to a 5 percent reduction in the present value of all future benefits. In contrast, an individual earning $120,000 will experience a cut of 50 percent at retirement, and a 56 percent cut in the present value of all benefits. Brown (2014) notes that one can construct examples of high income individuals for whom the present value of benefit reductions is over 70 percent.
Legal Challenges to the 2013 Reform
Given the magnitude of the benefit cuts and the protective language of the Illinois constitution, it is not surprising that this law was challenged in the courts. In fact, at least five lawsuits were filed by various parties in separate courts, but the Illinois Supreme Court ordered that the suits be consolidated. Their case appeared to receive a significant boost when the Illinois Supreme Court -considering the separate issue of reductions in retiree health care benefits in the Kanerva (2014) decision -ruled that "the state's provision of health insurance premium subsidies for retirees is a benefit of membership in a pension or retirement system within the meaning of article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution" and, as a result, these subsidies are constitutionally protected. Not only were the justices reinforcing the strength of the non-impairment clause, but in a development that was a surprise to many analysts, they extended the non-impairment clause to cover retiree health benefits on the grounds that these were a benefit of membership in state retirement system. that the non-impairment clause is "plain" and "unambiguous" that the pension reform "without question diminishes and impairs the benefits of membership in state retirement systems." If this decision stands, the pension reform law passed in December 2013 will be null and void, and the state will be back to square one on pension reform. Just as important, however, such a broad ruling would effectively rule out nearly every benefit change that could result in meaningful cost reductions to the state.
Naturally, the state appealed Judge Beltz' (2014) decision to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Oral arguments began on March 11, 2015. 5 The state's argument in the case is that the state is in a fiscal crisis, and that in such a crisis, the state has the "police power" to alter contracts.
Illinois Solicitor General Shapiro argued on the opening day of the trial:
Like all contracts, they can be altered. Thus, the legal argument in this case appears to rest on whether or not the State of Illinois has the power to abrogate a contract in the case of a fiscal emergency. If the state is deemed to have such power, then presumably the court will also need to be convinced that the state is, indeed, in a fiscal crisis that warrants such action.
As the two authors of this paper are economists rather than legal scholars, we dare not speculate on the legal dispensation of the case. In any event, we won't need to wait long, as the Illinois Supreme Court is expected to issue a ruling prior to May 31, 2015 (IFT 2015).
As economists, however, we believe it is useful to make two observations about the economic issues pertaining to this case. First, although there is no doubt whatsoever that A second observation is that Illinois seems to be implicitly admitting that the pension reform impaired benefits, albeit an impairment that is permitted under police powers. An alternative approach would have been to argue that the reform elements were not impairments at all, under an interpretation that the constitution protects accrued benefits, but not prospective benefits. If this approach were taken, at least some of the pension reform elements might be deemed constitutional. For example, the change to the Effective Rate of Interest would only apply prospectively, not retroactively, and thus would not affect accrued benefits. Of course, other provisions -such as an increase in the retirement age -would have been more difficult to defend in this way.
Governor Rauner's 2015 Proposal
Republican Bruce The core of his proposal is to freeze benefits of Tier I employees as of July 1, 2015 and permit no further accruals. For work after this date, additional pension accruals would operate according to the Tier II benefit structure explained above. Alternatively, workers would be permitted to opt for a defined contribution (DC) plan on a going forward basis. However, the proposal also appears to require that those taking this "buyout" would accept a reduction in the value of their automatic annual increase on benefits earned prior to July 1, 2015, and in return receive a lump-sum contribution to their new DC plan. The new DC plan would include an employer match, although the details of that match have not yet been specified.
There are, of course, two major obstacles to the Governor's proposal. First, it appears to be dead on arrival in the Democratic-controlled House and Senate. Second, the constitutionality of this proposal remains unclear. The Governor clearly argues in his budget documents (Rauner 2015b, pp. 2-16 ) that this would be constitutional because the changes "do not reduce earned benefits." It is far from clear, however, that the Illinois Supreme Court will view the constitutional protections as only applying to accrued benefits. Indeed, the 7 th Circuit Court decision discussed above makes no such distinction, effectively treating the non-impairment clause as also protecting prospective benefits of current employees.
THE BROADER FISCAL CONTEXT IN ILLINOIS
Fiscal Sustainability Problems and Opaque Budgeting Practices in Illinois
Illinois has had fiscal sustainability problems for decades. The underlying problem has been identified as a "structural deficit," a lower projected growth rate for sustainable revenue than for spending (Giertz, McGuire and Nowlan, 1996; Giertz 2007; CTBA 2008 .
Illinois also engages in a number of opaque budgeting practices that can make it quite difficult to come up with reliable and consistent measures of the state's fiscal status over time.
In addition to counting debt proceeds and asset sales as revenue, the spending side is equally complex. According to the Illinois Office of the Comptroller (IOC 2015c), there are 602 active state funds in Illinois, while only four of them constitute the "General Funds" of the state.
However, most reporting and public discourse on fiscal matters concentrates on just the general funds. It is not uncommon for there to be within-year transfers across funds or crossyear reassignments of spending responsibility across funds. As a result, the general funds budget reported by the state is not consistently defined over time, making it difficult to obtain an accurate time series of state revenues and expenditures. To conduct meaningful analysis in light of these difficulties, it becomes necessary to essentially reconstruct the entire set of Illinois revenue and expenditure categories in a consistent manner over time.
Measuring and Projecting Illinois' Fiscal Imbalances: The Fiscal Futures Project
To overcome the difficulties created by Illinois' inconsistent budget reporting and to make projections about future fiscal balances in Illinois, we make use of the model created by a team at the University of Illinois' Institute of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA). Known as the Fiscal Futures Project (FFP), the construction of this model started in 2008 to help build analytical capacity to inform long-term fiscal policy discussions, a capability that was largely missing in Illinois.
The FFP team has been analyzing and reporting on Illinois' fiscal problems for a number of years (Dye and McMillen 2009; Dye et al., 2010 Dye et al., , 2011 Dye et al., , 2012 Dye et al., , 2013 Dye et al., , 2014 . The interaction between problems funding pensions and problems funding the overall budget is a recurring focus of their analysis and serves as the basis for ours.
There are three essential elements in the FFP's analytical framework: (a) a broad-based measure of the state budget, to which we refer as the "all-funds budget," that categorizes revenues and expenditures in a manner that can be consistently tracked over time; (b) a longterm budget projection model for Illinois; and (c) a measure of sustainable revenue sources that distinguishes recurring revenue from non-revenue changes in the state's balance sheet. A more detailed description of these elements follows.
(a) All-Funds Budget: FFP has created and annually updates an "all-funds budget" for the State of Illinois, which groups budget items into a meaningful set of revenue and spending categories that are consistently measured over time. This conceptually simple (but time consuming and tedious) accounting exercise is a necessary first step for meaningful economic analysis.
(b) The Fiscal Futures Projection Model:
For each spending and revenue category, the projection model estimates the past relation to selected economic and demographic "driver" variables. These relations are then applied to projected values of the driver variables to make projections for budget components. The components can then be aggregated to project total revenue and total spending. The model develops baseline projections from current spending levels and existing revenue sources, which can then be compared to alternative tax or spending policies. The projection model is discussed in more detail in the Appendix.
(c) Sustainable Revenue: The Illinois Constitution states that "Appropriations for a fiscal year shall not exceed funds estimated by the General Assembly to be available during that year." However, Illinois law allows "funds … available" to include a range of options, including the issuance of debt, the use of one-time revenue sources, and asset sales. For example, if the state sells off its toll booth operations to a private party, it can claim the sale as a source of revenue in that year. In order to better distinguish revenue flows from asset sales, the FFP model focuses on "sustainable revenue" by excluding new borrowing and other one-time revenue sources.
PROJECTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS' FISCAL GAP AND THE ROLE OF PENSIONS
Most Recent Projections under Current Law
Each year, as data from a new fiscal year becomes available, the all-funds database is updated and the budget projections are re-estimated. Figure 3 present the most recent update from January 2015 (Dye, Hudspeth and Crosby, 2015) . The top two lines in Figure 3 show total spending and total sustainable revenue for Illinois' all-funds budget for the historical and 
The Effect of Pension Reform on Projected Fiscal Outlook
Alternative Budget Gap Measures
The summary measure of fiscal balance used by the Fiscal Futures Model is the budget gap, which is defined as the difference between total sustainable revenue and total expenditures. These items are measured on a cash basis, with appropriate adjustments to exclude from revenue the proceeds of new debt issuance or other balance sheet changes.
However, projecting the cash gap alone is does not capture changes in the state's pension funding status. To remedy this, the model produces an "Adjusted Budget Gap," which is just the Cash Gap from above, minus the change in unfunded pension liabilities, i.e.:
Adjusted Budget Gap = Cash Gap -Δ Unfunded Pension Liabilities This is a cash-accrual hybrid, not a full accrual measure for the state. Although it captures changes in the unfunded liability of the pension plans, it does not include changes in nonpension assets or changes in non-pension liabilities. More specifically, the cash gap is adjusted by subtracting the change in the "Unfunded Actuarially Accrued Liabilities." Thus, this ΔUAAL is a residual that captures the effect of (inadequate) contributions, changes in the value of pension assets, and changes in actuarial assumptions used to calculate liabilities such as the discount rate. Because it is based upon actuarial methods and assumptions, it is an admittedly weak proxy for the economic value of annual underfunding. Nonetheless, it is what we have available from public sources, and thus we forge ahead. The dashed line in Figure 4 shows the adjusted budget gap projections. Because of both the 90 percent target and back-loading, Illinois is scheduled to pay less than actuarially required contributions, and UAAL will increase through FY 2029. Thus the adjusted budget gap is worsemore negative -than the cash gap for the next 15 years; and increasingly better -less negative -from FY 2030 to 2045.
Alternative Policy Projections
One can also use this model to estimate the fiscal effects of Senate Bill 1 (SB1), the pension reform that was passed in December 2013 and which is now being challenged in the Illinois Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION
Illinois is an unfortunate but useful case study of the fiscal strain placed on states that run large negative fiscal imbalances for many decades. Illinois' public pensions have essentially been used as a source of borrowing, allowing the state to keep taxes lower and other spending higher than would be permitted if the state followed a more balanced budget process.
Public pensions are part of the fiscal problem in Illinois, but not for the reasons often asserted in public discussions. Policy makers, reporters, and other commentators often point to "excessive" public pensions as the root of all of Illinois' budget woes. Although it is quite easy to find examples of abuses in the Illinois pension system, as well as examples of individuals receiving extremely generous annual pension benefits that substantially exceed those available to the average private sector pension participant, our illustrative calculations suggest that those situations are outliers rather than the norm. Indeed, the data suggests that Illinois public pensions are not outliers compared to the generosity of other state pensions around the country. Some commentators will argue that public pensions in all states are too generous, an issue that we make no attempt to address in this paper. Rather, our point is that Illinois pensions are not outliers in terms of generosity, but they are outliers in terms of their funding status. This implies rather strongly that inadequate contributions to the pension funds are the primary cause of the low funding ratios of the state's pension plans.
Our examination of fiscal practices in Illinois reveals that accumulation of unfunded pension liabilities is just one -though overwhelmingly the largest -of many questionable timeshifting budget practices and part of an overall pattern of delaying payment and avoiding tough choices. The state has repeatedly shifted Medicaid payments to future years and allowed bills to other vendors to remain unpaid for months. Illinois has also routinely relied on one-time revenue sources, assets sales, balance transfers across funds and borrowing to pay for ongoing operations.
Looking forward, projections of future revenues and expenditures paint a bleak fiscal picture. The budget gap is projected to continue to widen, which will require additional revenue For some fiscal categories -especially those with large fluctuations over time where there is no good fit in the historical data -future growth is set to equal to inflation. For example, in Table 5 we see a number of smaller spending categories are set to grow at the projected rate of CPI inflation. 
